OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
This paper synthesizes non-cooperative and cooperative game theories to deepen our understanding of market design. We study the complex interplay between stability, efficiency, and revenue maximization in centralized mechanisms for two-sided markets. A stable mechanism is one whose equilibrium withstands deviations by participants, whether individual or collective, deterring external contracting. Gale and Shapley’s (1962) marriage model, and the competitive equilibrium theory of Arrow and Debreu (1954) underscore the importance of stability in securing favorable market outcomes. We establish that in two-sided trade model, it is possible to design mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced, with equilibria that align with the core. Additionally, this paper explores how the core’s convergence properties toward competitive equilibria under changes in information symmetry and market thickness.
