Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
We consider a package assignment problem where multiple units of indivisible objects are allocated to individuals. The seller’s preferences allow for additional costs or cost savings on certain packages of objects: e.g., a manufacturer may incur cost savings if they obtain a range of products or services from a single supplier. The objective is to find the socially efficient allocation among buyers. We propose a sealed-bid auction with a novel cost function graph to express the seller’s preferences. The graph structure facilitates the use of linear programming to find competitive, package-linear, and anonymous prices. If agents act as price takers, these prices support a competitive equilibrium, and an equilibrium always exists under additional assumptions.
