OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
We consider a package assignment problem where multiple units of indivisible objects are allocated to individuals. The seller’s preferences allow for additional costs or cost savings on certain packages of objects: e.g., a manufacturer may incur cost savings if they obtain a range of products or services from a single supplier. The objective is to find the socially efficient allocation among buyers. We propose a sealed-bid auction with a novel cost function graph to express the seller’s preferences. The graph structure facilitates the use of linear programming to find competitive, package-linear, and anonymous prices. If agents act as price takers, these prices support a competitive equilibrium, and an equilibrium always exists under additional assumptions.
