OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
Quota mechanisms are commonly used to elicit private information when agents face multiple decisions and monetary transfers are infeasible. As the number of decisions grows large, quotas asymptotically implement the same set of social choice functions as do separate mechanisms with transfers. We analyze the robustness of quota mechanisms. To set the correct quota, the designer must have precise knowledge of the environment. We show that, without transfers, only trivial social choice rules can be implemented in a prior-independent way. We obtain a tight bound on the decision error that results when the quota does not match the true type distribution. Finally, we show that in a multi-agent setting, quotas are robust to agents’ beliefs about each other. Crucially, quotas make the distribution of reports common knowledge.
