Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
To reserve a time to meet with the speaker, please register at the following form:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Lg_zRsQyTbf_WXqsVrZyfuoPeHVxRp9Mt9oiF9iSSIQ/edit#gid=0
Abstract:
Despite the potential for significant insights, the theory of contests has been rarely applied to price competition between firms. To help address this gap, our paper provides a general framework that encompasses a broad family of all-pay contests and sales competition models. For the case of two players, we analytically characterize all potential equilibria for any arbitrary level of asymmetry. To further demonstrate the power of this approach and the connections between contests and sales competition, we then consider a number of applications, including an advertising platform’s optimal choice of fees.
