Does deterrence work in cyberspace?
Understanding deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace is often difficult because our minds are captured by Cold War images of massive retaliation to a nuclear attack by nuclear means. The analogy to nuclear deterrence is misleading, however, because many aspects of cyber behavior are more like other behaviors such as crime that states try (imperfectly) to deter. Preventing harm in cyberspace involves four complex mechanisms: threats of punishment, denial, entanglement, and norms. Even when punishment is used, deterrent threats need not be limited to cyber responses, and they may address general behavior as well as specific acts. Cyber threats are plentiful, often ambiguous, and difficult to attribute. Problems of attribution are said to limit deterrence and dissuasion in the cyber domain, but three of the major means – denial by defense, entanglement; and normative taboos – are not strongly hindered by the attribution problem. The effectiveness of different mechanisms depends on context, and the question of whether deterrence works in cyberspace depends on “who and what.” Not all cyberattacks are of equal importance; not all can be deterred; and not all rise to the level of significant national security threats. The lesson for policymakers is to focus on the most important attacks and to understand the full range of mechanisms and contexts in which they can be prevented.
Date: 9 June 2017, 17:30 (Friday, 7th week, Trinity 2017)
Venue: Blavatnik School of Government, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter OX2 6GG
Venue Details: Accessible building
Speaker: Professor Joseph Nye
Organising department: Blavatnik School of Government
Organiser contact email address: events@bsg.ox.ac.uk
Topics:
Booking required?: Required
Booking url: https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/events/does-deterrence-work-cyberspace
Cost: Free
Audience: Public
Editor: Lucy Forsyth