OxTalks is Changing
Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
We propose a measure of strategic complexity for strategy-proof mechanisms in terms of the contingent reasoning they require agents to engage in to recognize their dominant strategy. Our rankings are consistent with the coarser ones implied by the solution concepts of (strong) obvious strategy-proofness (Li, 2017b; Pycia and Troyan, 2023b). The added flexibility of our approach allows a designer to balance a mechanism’s implicity with other objectives: We characterize the Ausubel (2004) auction as the simplest way to implement the VCG outcome in multi-unit allocation problems with transfers, and provide novel rankings of mechanisms that implement stable outcomes in matching problems.
Date:
21 November 2025, 14:15
Venue:
Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details:
Butler Room
Speaker:
Lea Nagel (Harvard University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Edward Valenzano
