School Choice: A market design approach (Abdulkadiroglu & Sönmez, 2003)
A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.
Date: 23 May 2022, 15:00
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room C or Join on Zoom https://zoom.us/j/99315270903
Speaker: Nils Lager (University of Oxford)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Novel Ideas: MPhil Seminar Series
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Emma Heritage