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Information Design in Coalition Formation Games
Abstract
I examine a setting, where an information sender conducts research into a payoff-relevant state variable, and releases information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents’ actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The sender, who has commitment power, by designing an information mechanism (a set of signals and a probability distribution over them), maximises his payoff, which depends on the action taken by the agents, and the state variable. I derive the optimal information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games. I show that the coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. I also apply the results to International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), where a central authority, as an information sender, attempts to reduce the global level of greenhouse gases(GHG) by communication of information on social cost of GHG.
Date:
15 May 2018, 12:45
Venue:
Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details:
Butler Room
Speaker:
Sareh Vosooghi (University of Oxford)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Organisers:
Anne Pouliquen (University of Oxford),
Erin Saunders (University of Oxford)
Part of:
Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Anne Pouliquen,
Melis Clark,
Erin Saunders
