Marina Halac: Monitoring Teams (with Ilan Kremer and Eyal Winter)
A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint performance. We show that unlike under partial implementation, the principal always exhausts her monitoring capacity to optimally implement work as a unique outcome. Optimal monitoring teams are homogeneous between them: equally sized and with agents allocated in an anti-assortative fashion. Higher-effort-cost agents receive lower rents, and they tend to be monitored more closely than lower-effort-cost agents when the principal’s allocation is constrained.
Date:
3 December 2021, 15:15 (Friday, 8th week, Michaelmas 2021)
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Join online https://zoom.us/j/91802954429?pwd=ZzNyeEcvL3JjN2NPVWZHVG9hcmR1UT09
Speaker:
Marina Halac (Yale University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Emma Heritage
