Sequential Mechanisms for Evidence Acquisition
We consider optimal mechanisms for inducing agents to acquire costly evidence in a setting where a principal has a good to allocate that all agents want. We show that optimal mechanisms are necessarily sequential in nature and have a threshold structure. Agents with higher costs of obtaining evidence and/or worse distributions of value for the principal are asked for evidence later, if at all. We derive these results using a static optimization problem to characterize the optimal allocation of the good and the probability each agent is asked for evidence, followed by constructing a dynamic mechanism that achieves this outcome.
Date:
10 March 2023, 14:15 (Friday, 8th week, Hilary 2023)
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room G or https://zoom.us/j/93867615769?pwd=VmRJVVRkYlhUajllTEJyd2NsTUs3QT09
Speaker:
Bart Lipman (Boston University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Public
Editor:
Emma Heritage
