The Comparative Statics of Persuasion (with Gregorio Curello)
In the canonical persuasion model, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender’s interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first theorem identifies an ordinal notion of ‘increased convexity’ that we show characterises those shifts of the sender’s interim payoff that lead her optimally to choose no less informative signals. To strengthen this conclusion to ‘more informative’ requires further assumptions: our second theorem identifies the necessary and sufficient condition on the sender’s interim payoff, which strictly generalises the ‘S’-shape commonly imposed in the literature.
Date: 14 June 2022, 12:45
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Road C or join Zoom https://zoom.us/j/99759486691?pwd=MnVodzd0ZlFiWlRFMHRNT3FQa0dmUT09
Speaker: Ludvig Sinander (University of Oxford)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Emma Heritage