On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
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We propose a two-stage replacement for established “clearinghouse” or “captive and shopper” pricing models: second-stage retail prices are constrained by first-stage list prices. In contrast to the mixed-strategy equilibria of single-stage games, a unique profile of distinct prices is supported by the play of pure strategies along the equilibrium path, and so we predict stable price dispersion. We find novel results in applications to models of sales, product prominence, advertising, and consumer search.