A Theory of Experienced Utility and Utilitarianism
I present a theory of measurement of preference intensities and well-being and use this measure as a foundation for utilitarianism. To do this, I consider outcomes as being experienced over time. An individual has preferences over such experiences. I present axioms under which preferences are represented by an experienced utility representation (XU) equal to the integral of instantaneous well-being over time and unique up to a positive scalar. I propose an ethical postulate under which societal preferences are utilitarian in experienced utilities.
Date:
25 January 2022, 12:45 (Tuesday, 2nd week, Hilary 2022)
Venue:
Join Zoom Meeting: https://zoom.us/j/99759486691
Speaker:
Loren Fryxell (GPI, University of Oxford)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Emma Heritage
