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The use of moral intuitions seems indispensable to doing moral philosophy, yet there is no consensus on what they are or what justificatory force they have. Without such a complete theory of moral intuitions we cannot tell the good ones from the bad. I won’t be providing such a theory. Instead I will make some modest, theory neutral claims about what conditions our use of moral intuitions should meet in order to be successful. Using these relatively uncontroversial criteria of successful use I will argue that some of our most commonly used species of moral intuitions are bad ones.
