OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
The use of moral intuitions seems indispensable to doing moral philosophy, yet there is no consensus on what they are or what justificatory force they have. Without such a complete theory of moral intuitions we cannot tell the good ones from the bad. I won’t be providing such a theory. Instead I will make some modest, theory neutral claims about what conditions our use of moral intuitions should meet in order to be successful. Using these relatively uncontroversial criteria of successful use I will argue that some of our most commonly used species of moral intuitions are bad ones.
