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Reputation Effects with Endogenous Records
A patient player interacts with a sequence of short-run players. The patient player is either an honest type who always takes a commitment action and never erases any record, or an opportunistic type who decides which action to take and whether to erase that action from his record at a low cost. We show that the patient player will have an incentive to build a reputation in every equilibrium and can secure a payoff that is strictly greater than his commitment payoff after accumulating a long enough good record. However, as long as the patient player has a sufficiently long lifespan, his equilibrium payoff must be close to his minmax value. Although a small probability of opportunistic type can wipe out all of the patient player’s returns from building reputations, it only has a negligible effect on the short-run players’ welfare.
Date:
8 March 2024, 14:15
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room G or https://zoom.us/j/93867615769?pwd=T1NsTEVwNE40R3pEVW9yTlBicG1mdz09
Speaker:
Harry Pei (Northwestern University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Shreyasi Banerjee,
Edward Valenzano
