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The Incentives to (Not) Debate in Low Information Races
Why are there few candidate debates in low information elections where they have the greatest potential to inform vote choices? One explanation is that candidates have weak incentives to reveal their qualifications and resources to voters. Indeed, in private elicitation of 400 Parliamentary candidates in Sierra Leone only one quarter volunteer to debate. Yet introducing guaranteed public dissemination platforms sharply increases their participation. Alternatively, debates may lack market viability. Counter to this, we document high voter willingness to pay to access debates and private sector interest in disseminating them. To satisfy voter demand, public platforms can remedy weak incentives by imposing nonparticipation costs on reluctant politicians.
Date:
31 January 2024, 11:00
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room A
Speaker:
Kate Casey (Stanford)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Political Economy Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Shreyasi Banerjee
