On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
If you have any questions, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
We study a seller’s choice between offering a finished or unfinished product. Finishing the product is costly and fully reveals its value to prospective buyers, while selling it unfinished introduces uncertainty about the product’s value and requires buyers to complete development themselves. Under symmetric information—i.e., when the seller also observes the value of a finished product—it is optimal to offer a finished product whenever development costs are low. Under asymmetric information, however, finishing the product introduces informational frictions. We characterize the conditions under which the product is offered finished despite these frictions, in order to discourage consumer search.
