Iterative Reasoning and Strategic Uncertainty
For those attending in-person, the entrance to CESS is located at George Street Mews and you will need to ring the bell when you have arrived.
Strategic uncertainty is the ambiguity that players face in games against other strategic opponents. Research shows that attitudes toward strategic uncertainty are source dependent, i.e., a player may express an aversion to or preference for strategic uncertainty depending on the game. One game may also be more or less uncertain than another. Which characteristics of a game determine the perceived level of and preference for strategic uncertainty? We propose to experimentally investigate the role of iterative reasoning (iterative best response or iterative application of dominance) on strategic uncertainty. By varying the parameters of a beauty contest game, we can turn iterative reasoning on and off and vary the number of reasoning steps required to reach the Nash equilibrium. We propose to measure strategic uncertainty attitudes using the belief hedges approach of Baillon et al. (2021). With further treatments, we can study when iterative reasoning makes a game more or less uncertain.
Date: 29 November 2023, 14:00 (Wednesday, 8th week, Michaelmas 2023)
Venue: Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, George Street OX1 2AA
Venue Details: This is a hybrid event--interested participants can attend in-person at Cess's conference room or virtually via Zoom.
Speaker: Muhammed Bulutay (Technical University of Berlin)
Organising department: Nuffield College
Organiser: Noah Bacine (University of Oxford)
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Host: Noah Bacine (University of Oxford)
Part of: CESS Colloquium Series
Booking required?: Recommended
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Audience: Public
Editors: Noah Bacine, Martina Beretta