Private Information about the Game Horizon
The starting point of this paper is the dichotomy in repeated games between finite horizon games with a commonly known ending time and infinite horizon games where the ending time is unknown. We study an environment in between where players privately know a deadline at which the game must end at the latest. Our main result shows that cooperation can be sustained even when there is a strong correlation between the private deadline, i.e., when the informational environment is arbitrarily close to the common knowledge of the ending time. The leading application is collaboration in a partnership before dissolution, in which we ask if cooperation can be sustained when both partners know that the relationship is going to break down.
Date: 9 February 2024, 14:15 (Friday, 4th week, Hilary 2024)
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room G or https://zoom.us/j/93867615769?pwd=T1NsTEVwNE40R3pEVW9yTlBicG1mdz09
Speaker: Julia Salmi (University of Copenhagen)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editors: Shreyasi Banerjee, Edward Clark