Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
Please sign up for meetings using the below:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lyNu-tHHJ15Se57I0BMvTVqYV0-Yxx6WShyLXVviqlg/edit#gid=0
We study when pure bundling, i.e., offering only the grand bundle of all products, is optimal for a multi-product monopolist. Pure bundling is optimal if consumers with higher value for the grand bundle have lower relative disutility for consuming smaller bundles. Conversely, pure bundling is not optimal if consumers with higher value for the grand bundle have higher relative disutility for consuming smaller bundles. We prove the results using a decomposition approach that relies on identifying binding incentive constraints with multi-dimensional heterogeneity.
