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We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable properties can be ensured under opacity in a robust sense: A property can be guaranteed under an opaque announcement if every mechanism compatible with it satisfies the property. We find an impossibility result: strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed under any level of opacity. In some environments, weak Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness can be guaranteed under opacity.
