OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
We study many-to-one matching with transfers and peer effects, such as matching workers to firms, students to schools, residents to neighborhoods, or consumers to status goods. The setting generalizes both assignment models (optimal transport) and Bayesian persuasion. Equilibrium exists and is efficient under general conditions. We give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for positive segregation, where workers are segregated and matched to firms in a positively assortative manner. When this condition fails, equilibrium features alternating intervals of segregation and compression. Comparative statics characterize when equilibrium is more segregated or more compressed. When peer effects are unpriced (as in school or neighborhood choice), we characterize when equilibrium is excessively segregated.
