Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. The two-week OxTalks freeze period starts on Monday 2nd March. During this time, there will be no facility to publish or edit events. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period. Once Oxford Events launches, you will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
Abstract
How much are you willing to pay to play a given coordination game? In his seminal work, Schelling (1960) noted that traditional game theory does not assign a value to coordination games, and suggested that this is because people’s success in coordinating cannot be understood from economic primitives alone (e.g., pp. 97-98). We therefore incorporate insights from psychology into the standard game-theoretic model to model how people take the perspective of others, and use this to assign a unique value to symmetric two-player, two-action coordination games. Behavior is shaped both by payoffs and by strategic uncertainty. When higher payoffs increase strategic uncertainty, the value of the game decreases. Extensions are discussed.
