OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
A seller with one unit of a good faces N >= 3 buyers and a single competitor. Buyers who do not get the good from the seller will compete in a second-price auction for one other identical unit. We characterize the optimal mechanism for the seller in this setting and show that it cannot be implemented by a standard auction. Instead, it can be implemented by a modified third-price or first-price auction with transfers between the seller and the two highest bidders. The optimal mechanism features allocation to the buyer with the second-highest valuation and a withholding rule that depends on the second- and third-highest valuations. We show that this withholding rule raises significantly more revenue than would a standard reserve price. We also consider the novel implications of sequential cross-mechanism spillovers for competition between sellers.
Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1UnW-JOf7vD54h9QKWYWXQS1Wc-H4oP7nbywDdeJvr4o/edit#gid=0
Link to paper: www.ssc.wisc.edu/~hendrick/working%20papers/Sequential_Mechanism_Sep2019.pdf
