Firm and Market Response to Saving Constraints: Evidence from the Kenyan Dairy Industry
Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is scarce evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Multiple experimental designs in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: i) farmers are willing to pay sizable costs for infrequent payments, which provide commitment to save for lumpy expenses; ii) imperfect contract enforcement limits competition among buyers in the supply of infrequent payments; iii) in such a market, producers’ supply responses to price increases depend on both buyer credibility and payment frequency. Infrequent payments for frequently supplied goods and services are widespread and may provide stronger and more natural commitment than financial products not tied to income sources.

Written with Rocco Macchiavello, LSE
Date: 14 February 2018, 12:30
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Lecture Theatre
Speaker: Lorenzo Casaburi (University of Zurich)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Organisers: Amma Panin (Nuffield College), Rossa O'Keeffe-O'Donovan (Nuffield College), Michael Koelle (Pembroke College)
Organiser contact email address: suzanne.george@economics.ox.ac.uk
Part of: CSAE Lunchtime Seminars
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Public
Editors: Julia Coffey, Suzanne George