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I will argue that ontological nihilism, i.e. the view that there are no things is a consistent position. Secondly, I shall discuss an argument for the view that nihilism is not just possibly but actually true, that is that there actually are no things. I am going to conclude by some reflections on the consequences of the nihilist position for project of constructing a fundamental metaphysical theory.
(Wine and soft drinks will be provided)
