OxTalks will soon be transitioning to Oxford Events (full details are available on the Staff Gateway). A two-week publishing freeze is expected to start before the end of Hilary Term to allow all future events to be migrated to the new platform. During this period, you will not be able to submit or edit events on OxTalks. The exact freeze dates will be confirmed on the Staff Gateway and via email to identified OxTalks users.
If you have any questions, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
It may be individually optimal to wait and learn from the experiences of others before investing in a new technology. However, informational free-riding is collectively harmful as it slows down innovation adoption. This paper studies the dynamic tradeoff between disclosure and generation of evidence. A welfare-maximizing designer can delay the disclosure of previously generated information in order to speed up adoption. The optimal policy transparently discloses bad news and delays good news. This finding resonates with regulation demanding that fatal breakdowns be reported promptly. The designer’s intervention makes all agents better off.
