OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
In aggregative games individuals’ payoffs depend on players’ own contribution (or strategy) and on the aggregate contribution of other players. The replacement function, which defines the optimal contribution of a player in an aggregate contribution, is a convenient tool to analyze aggregative games. In this paper the replacement function is used to define an adjustment process of expectations with respect to the aggregate strategy of the game. The Nash equilibrium of the game is interpreted as the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) of the dynamical system defined by that adjustment process. The expectational stability of the REE is analyzed and its local stability is characterized in terms of the fundamentals and the REE itself. Stronger results of global stability can be obtained when the model is applied to specific aggregative games with explicit payoff functions. Examples of Cournot oligopoly and public goods provision games are presented to illustrate global stability.
