Why do well-meaning developmental policies so often fail? Consider the recent collapse of the well-constructed peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC guerillas. Likewise, privatizing former Soviet assets in Russia engendered authoritarian kleptocracy. In such cases, self-interested activity of powerful agents undermines policy initiatives. Alas, achieving inclusive development entails resolving dense collective-action problems of forging cooperation among agents with disparate resources, interests, and understandings. Resolution requires functional configurations of inclusive informal and formal institutions. Yet, powerful actors shape institutional evolution in their favor—because they can. How to proceed?

In this seminar, I will outline elements of a conceptual framework for policy-relevant inquiry into such dilemmas. I will open with background for systematically conceptualizing power, social dilemmas, and four types of agency: leadership, following, brokerage, and institutional entrepreneurship. I will focus on the latter. Institutional entrepreneurs invest resources into discovering narratives and actions in efforts to influence the political-economic and normative understandings that underlie strategic interactions. Such interactions influence trajectories of institutional evolution. By extension they condition prospects for resolving developmental dilemmas. Moreover, these dynamics operate within specific social contexts that are framed by identifiable distinctions in configurations of power. Policymakers beware.

This systematic approach to power, and agency facilitates inquiry into the roots and consequences of context-specific developmental dilemmas. As such, it offers conceptual foundation for developmental policy inquiry and analysis.