“The comparative statics of persuasion” with Gregorio Curello (University of Bonn)
In the canonical persuasion model, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender’s interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first theorem identifies a coarse notion of ‘increased convexity’ that we show characterises those shifts of the sender’s interim payoff that lead her optimally to choose no less informative signals. To strengthen this conclusion to ‘more informative’ requires further assumptions: our second theorem identifies the necessary and sufficient condition on the sender’s interim payoff, which strictly generalises the ‘S’ shape commonly imposed in the literature. We identify conditions under which increased alignment of interests between sender and receiver lead to comparative statics, and study applications.
Date: 3 October 2023, 12:30
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room C or https://zoom.us/j/94428672489?pwd=c3N3a1FTRUpQcDJaVld4Tll5ekRzUT09
Speaker: Ludvig Sinander (University of Oxford)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Emma Heritage