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The Generic Finiteness Theorem for outcomes of extensive-form games is extended to finitely complex repeated games. Components of equilibria are thus outcome-equivalent, and if they are also strongly symmetric and strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens, Econometrica 1986, 54:1003-1039), then I show that they generate the outcome of an efficient, renegotiation-proof equilibrium for two arbitrarily patient players.
