OxTalks is Changing
On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
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Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information
We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty.
Date:
27 April 2021, 12:45
Venue:
Held on Zoom
Speaker:
Marcelo Fernandez (Johns Hopkins University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Learning, Games and Network Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Melis Clark
