OxTalks is Changing
OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information
We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty.
Date:
27 April 2021, 12:45
Venue:
Held on Zoom
Speaker:
Marcelo Fernandez (Johns Hopkins University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Learning, Games and Network Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Melis Clark
