OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
Please sign up for meetings at the link below:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1t147hTaa3u0f4TcsAmhz2TXceVzEh6×73LrUVIYxHDM/edit#gid=0
Abstract:
Nash equilibria used in economics and other interactive systems are highly stable in a sense made precise in this paper. Low stability equilibria are less credible and require special care and possible modifications before being applied. The paper discusses an index of strategic stability for n-person normal form games. In addition to the definitions and related properties, it discusses the stability aspects of well-known and commonly observed Nash equilibria.
