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Abstract:
Nash equilibria used in economics and other interactive systems are highly stable in a sense made precise in this paper. Low stability equilibria are less credible and require special care and possible modifications before being applied. The paper discusses an index of strategic stability for n-person normal form games. In addition to the definitions and related properties, it discusses the stability aspects of well-known and commonly observed Nash equilibria.
