Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. The two-week OxTalks freeze period starts on Monday 2nd March. During this time, there will be no facility to publish or edit events. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period. Once Oxford Events launches, you will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
Please sign up for meetings at the link below:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1t147hTaa3u0f4TcsAmhz2TXceVzEh6×73LrUVIYxHDM/edit#gid=0
Abstract:
Nash equilibria used in economics and other interactive systems are highly stable in a sense made precise in this paper. Low stability equilibria are less credible and require special care and possible modifications before being applied. The paper discusses an index of strategic stability for n-person normal form games. In addition to the definitions and related properties, it discusses the stability aspects of well-known and commonly observed Nash equilibria.
