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How a Minimum Carbon Price Commitment Might Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality
It is difficult to resolve the global warming free-rider externality problem by negotiating many different quantity targets. By contrast, negotiating a single internationally-binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained) counters pure self-interest. A uniform price embodies “countervailing force” against free riding by automatically incentivizing parties to internalize the externality via a simple understandable formula that embodies a common climate commitment based on principles of reciprocity, quid-pro-quo and I-will-if-you-will. The talk is somewhat technical, being centered on a mathematical model. Some implications are discussed.
Date:
14 June 2016, 15:00
Venue:
Seminar Room C, Department of Economics, Manor Road Building
Speaker:
Martin L. Weitzman (Harvard University)
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Public
Editor:
Alice Chautard
