OxTalks will soon be transitioning to Oxford Events (full details are available on the Staff Gateway). A two-week publishing freeze is expected in early Hilary to allow all events to be migrated to the new platform. During this period, you will not be able to submit or edit events on OxTalks. The exact freeze dates will be confirmed as soon as possible.
If you have any questions, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
I propose a model for analyzing bidding under strategic uncertainty. Bidders neither know the strategies of the other bidders, nor the entire distribution of the bids of the other bidders. Instead, they only know some moments of the bid distributions. Bidders deal with the ambiguity by minimizing maximal loss. I use the model to predict behavior in experiments. Moreover, I use it to estimate the cost distribution in highway procurement auctions. I also present some results for other games.
