In many markets, both consumers and regulators care about characteristics of the product itself (e.g., safety) or of the production process (e.g., pollution). At the same time, it is typical that neither the regulator nor consumers have the relevant information. NGOs and activists often have the motivation, expertise, and capacity to acquire such information, but to influence the market they need to present this information to either consumers, who might subsequently boycott the product, or to the regulator, who might enforce the regulation or adopt stricter requirements. We argue that since regulator’s actions affect the whole market, communication with the regulator (“informational lobbying”) necessitates the use of hard, verifiable information. Conversely, communication with consumers (“informational boycotts”) may be credible with soft information. We show that activists are more effective at boycotts if the market is very competitive, and are effective at incentivizing investment in safer products or cleaner technologies (CSR) in oligopolistic markets. In a monopolistic market, activists resort to informational lobbying, but otherwise might prefer “closed-door” policies as a commitment not to use this channel.

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