On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
If you have any questions, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
This project studies incentives for private learning in a game of strategic information transmission. We show that information that is sufficiently costly to acquire can only be transmitted coarsely. We provide comparatives statics results showing that a more nuanced categorization provides weaker incentives for information acquisition than a coarser one. Finally, we consider two welfare-improving extensions: information design and delegation.
