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This project studies incentives for private learning in a game of strategic information transmission. We show that information that is sufficiently costly to acquire can only be transmitted coarsely. We provide comparatives statics results showing that a more nuanced categorization provides weaker incentives for information acquisition than a coarser one. Finally, we consider two welfare-improving extensions: information design and delegation.
