On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
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Hanson (2003, 2007) proposed the use of the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) for eliciting private information about a future, verifiable, event. A market maker sets a baseline probabilistic forecast of the event and subsequent market participants report their own forecasts. Each participant is paid the logarithmic score of each of their forecasts, and pays the logarithmic score of the previous forecast. I show that the LMSR admits a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies in a setting in which agents receive information dynamically over several periods. This generalizes previous results in which information arrival is static, strengthening the status of the LMSR as an attractive payment scheme for prediction markets and forecasting tournaments.
