We study how the rising economic power of a disenfranchised elite can increase its demand for de facto power-sharing during the precolonial period, and how the distribution of de jure political power may be altered by colonial rule. We draw on evidence from Khedival Egypt to argue that rural social conflicts can also lead to meaningful demands for power-sharing in agrarian autocracies. Like many cases in the Global South, Egypt’s modern economic development was tied to agricultural commodity booms driven by a globalizing economy and industrial demand from the Global North. This changing rural economy shifted power relations between incumbent agricultural elites and the rising rural bourgeoisie, particularly with regard to control over agricultural labor. We argue that acute social conflicts over rural labor – particularly in agriculturally productive localities – resulted in more rural bourgeoisie demands for de facto power-sharing in formal political institutions in the precolonial period. Colonization may subsequently suppress the representation of the rising elites in its quest for political stability. In our analysis, we employ a wide range of novel data sources on Members of Parliament (MPs) in 1824–1923, parliamentary minutes from 1868–1882, and 19th century Egyptian census data on labor coercion. We qualitatively document the rise in rural bourgeoisie demands for power-sharing within the parliament prior to the occupation. We then show quantitatively that the distribution of political power was fundamentally altered by colonial changes to the legislature after the British occupation of 1882.