OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
This paper develops a canonical model of deliberative democracy as part of a policy process. It studies how deliberation affects incentives and behaviour in three contexts: (i) compliance with policies (ii) equilibrium policy choices in a representative democracy and (iii) incentives to protest. The paper explores whether there are welfare gains from increased deliberation and how these depend on changes in equilibrium behaviour.
