Do states suffer reputational consequences when they exit international organizations (IOs)? And do the effects depend on whether states exit through voluntary withdrawal as opposed to forced suspension? We argue that states likely face negative reputational consequences for both types of IO exit because they are each equated with reneging on an international agreement. IO exit signals that the state may be more likely to back out of other international commitments: it stigmatizes the state as being a less reliable partner, and other actors in the international community are thus likely to downgrade that state’s reputation. Nevertheless, we expect that suspension generates stronger reputational damage than withdrawal because suspension indicates punishment by a peer group for misbehavior whereas withdrawal is not usually a rule violation, is self-selected, and managed. We test whether IO exit affects state reputation using novel data on all exits across 143 states and 534 IOs between 1984 and 2022. We measure state reputation using global market analysts’ perceptions of a state’s political risk; this captures states’ potential for following through on international commitments in an increasingly globalized world. Results indicate that both withdrawal and suspension are associated with reputational damage for the exiting state, though, as expected, suspension generates more reputational damage than withdrawal. As states use various strategies to contest IO rules, our results show an important way that IOs can enable decentralized enforcement mechanisms: global market analysts downgrade states for reneging on international commitments.