Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
To reserve a time to meet with the speaker, please register at the following form:
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Abstract: We study Tullock contests in which the common value of the price is uncertain. We provide a simple framework in which general information structures can be easily described, and equilibrium can be easily characterized. This characterization allows us to obtain interesting results about how information influences players’ equilibrium efforts and payoffs. When the cost of effort exhibits sufficiently large (small) diseconomies of scale, in contests with symmetric information expected effort decreases (increases) as players become better informed, while in two-player contests with asymmetric information, a player with information advantage exerts less (more) effort, in expectation, than his opponent. In classic Tullock contests, when players have symmetric information the equilibrium expected effort and payoff are independent of the information available to the players. When information is asymmetric, a player’s information advantage is rewarded. Moreover, while in a two-player contest both players exert the same expected effort regardless of their information, expected effort is smaller when one player has information advantage than when both players have the same information; interestingly, a better informed player wins the prize less frequently.
