OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
We analyse a game in which a sender chooses a point of release for information on a communication network. The information then travels through the network to receivers, acquiring noise. We show with quadratic loss preferences the sender wants to provide information to the most central receiver if preferences are sufficiently aligned, else they want to provide information to the least central receiver. In contrast we show with heterogeneous receiver preferences it may remain optimal for the sender to link to the most central receiver even when all receivers on the network are very misaligned with the sender. In a setting with two competing senders, we show that a sender whose preferences are misaligned with receivers may find it optimal to imitate the link formation decision of the other sender, even if this implies linking to the most central receiver.
