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We exhibit a voting method for elections that is resistant to strategic voting and elects the majority winner (i.e., the Condorcet winner) when voters’ preferences over candidates are single-peaked, meaning that a voter prefers candidates closer to her in ideology to those further away. Moreover, we show that this system is essentially the unique strategy-resistant method among all voting systems satisfying anonymity (equal treatment of voters) and neutrality (equal treatment of candidates) for single-peaked preferences.
Preferences in actual political elections do not usually adhere strictly to single-peakedness. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that in every state and federal ranked-choice election held in the U.S. to date preferences satisfy a weak form of single-peakedness sufficient to ensure that a slight modification of our voting method remains strategic-resistant.
Thus, we commend this voting system as an especially attractive proposal for voting reform in the United States
