OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
This paper looks at the contractual provisions in pre-1929 sovereign bonds in order to explore how sovereigns deployed hypothecation clauses to signal their willingness to commit to repayment. Although these contract terms were not enforceable in court, private institutions such as the London Stock Exchange refused new listings from sovereigns in default on previous contracts. Economic theory suggests that a borrower can be made better off “bargaining” for severe punishment as a way to credibly signal to creditors the intent to fulfill the contract. Our data set allows us to test whether contractual clauses in sovereign debt agreements are examples of such a bargain, and to measure the value of contractual commitments.
