On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
If you have any questions, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
A patient player interacts with a sequence of short-run players. The patient player is either an honest type who always takes a commitment action and never erases any record, or an opportunistic type who decides which action to take and whether to erase that action from his record at a low cost. We show that the patient player will have an incentive to build a reputation in every equilibrium and can secure a payoff that is strictly greater than his commitment payoff after accumulating a long enough good record. However, as long as the patient player has a sufficiently long lifespan, his equilibrium payoff must be close to his minmax value. Although a small probability of opportunistic type can wipe out all of the patient player’s returns from building reputations, it only has a negligible effect on the short-run players’ welfare.
