On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
If you have any questions, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
The starting point of this paper is the dichotomy in repeated games between finite horizon games with a commonly known ending time and infinite horizon games where the ending time is unknown. We study an environment in between where players privately know a deadline at which the game must end at the latest. Our main result shows that cooperation can be sustained even when there is a strong correlation between the private deadline, i.e., when the informational environment is arbitrarily close to the common knowledge of the ending time. The leading application is collaboration in a partnership before dissolution, in which we ask if cooperation can be sustained when both partners know that the relationship is going to break down.
