OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
The starting point of this paper is the dichotomy in repeated games between finite horizon games with a commonly known ending time and infinite horizon games where the ending time is unknown. We study an environment in between where players privately know a deadline at which the game must end at the latest. Our main result shows that cooperation can be sustained even when there is a strong correlation between the private deadline, i.e., when the informational environment is arbitrarily close to the common knowledge of the ending time. The leading application is collaboration in a partnership before dissolution, in which we ask if cooperation can be sustained when both partners know that the relationship is going to break down.
