Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
The starting point of this paper is the dichotomy in repeated games between finite horizon games with a commonly known ending time and infinite horizon games where the ending time is unknown. We study an environment in between where players privately know a deadline at which the game must end at the latest. Our main result shows that cooperation can be sustained even when there is a strong correlation between the private deadline, i.e., when the informational environment is arbitrarily close to the common knowledge of the ending time. The leading application is collaboration in a partnership before dissolution, in which we ask if cooperation can be sustained when both partners know that the relationship is going to break down.
