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Philosophical discussion of explanation in perceptual science commonly focuses on the so-called ‘hard problem of consciousness’ which emphasizes the lack of an explanation of phenomenal facts in neurological and computational accounts of the brain. But here I want to look at some cases where theorists purport to have explanations of some aspects of our experience. The real puzzle here, I want to suggest, is not rejecting the purported explanations, but finding an appropriate setting for why they count as explanations.
